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Introduction
The question of how the United States went from dismissing Saudi Arabia as an unimportant
backwater to having the kingdom as one of its most important Middle Eastern allies and trading
partners is a counterintuitive puzzle, one that has long intrigued foreign policy journalists and think
tank politicos. These contemporary foreign policy experts typically present American diplomacy
with Saudi Arabia as the pursuit of national interest in accordance with a realist interpretation of
international relations.1 The United States needed oil during and after World War II and Saudi
Arabia had lots of oil. Since both countries were united in opposition to Fascism during the war,
and then later to Communism, the differences in their religion and government mattered less than
these shared interests. Some of them mention the role Standard Oil of California (Socal) and the
Texas Company (Texaco) played in developing the Saudi oil industry, or the diplomatic exchanges
between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding Saudi Arabia. However, most
contemporary journalists and think tank fellows ignore how the oil companies themselves
impacted government policy when discussing the roots of American-Saudi diplomacy.
Historical scholarship on American-Saudi diplomacy is generally more sophisticated, and
there are several authors who have analyzed the oil companies’ operations in Saudi Arabia and the
decisions made by diplomatic and military bureaucrats in the broader context of American
diplomacy with the Allied Powers diplomacy during World War II.2 Even so, much of this
scholarship is not without its shortcomings. Some authors, especially those previously employed
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as United States government officials, offer detailed accounts of the American government’s
involvement in (and strategic concern for) Saudi oil, but make the aforementioned mistake of
treating the American oil industry as a tangential player, one that needed the government’s
encouragement to expand operations in the kingdom.3 Other scholars do not pay sufficient
attention to the effect World War II had on American-Saudi diplomacy, treating it as a footnote
while instead discussing either the interwar years or the early Cold War period.4 Finally, while
some authors correctly review the effects of World War II on American-Saudi diplomacy, their
scope is too broad to adequately explain the mechanisms by which the diplomatic relationship
between the two countries grew and developed.5
This paper is an analysis of the roots, causes, growth, and development of American-Saudi
diplomacy from the end of World War I to the beginning of 1946, when the Americans and Saudis
signed an airfield lease agreement at Dhahran. Building on historical scholarship, this analysis will
primarily use the American government’s internal memos and correspondences about Saudi
Arabia from this time period to explore how the United States crafted its foreign policy with respect
to the kingdom, how and why this foreign policy changed over time, and the role various
government and private actors played in shaping it. In doing so, it will deconstruct the concept of
national interest in American-Saudi diplomacy, and present a clearer picture of America’s national
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interest, how it was decided upon, and who decided upon it. What will become apparent is that
states are not uniform, cohesive actors, but a collection of different bureaucratic departments and
different branches of government that are further influenced by external actors. In the case of
American foreign policy in Saudi Arabia, Socal and Texaco corresponded with officials in the
Departments of State and Interior, and those officials determined America’s strategic interests and
made foreign policy after discussions with US military leaders and British diplomats.
The American oil industry began petitioning the government to protect their interests in
the Middle East almost immediately after World War I. With respect to Saudi Arabia, oil company
personnel and the Socal concession were foundational for US-Saudi diplomacy, not only because
the American government sought to protect the concession, but because it relied to a large degree
on the companies’ executives and representatives for information about the situation in the
kingdom. Before World War II, the State Department generally did not interact directly with the
government of Saudi Arabia, which left plenty of room for oilmen to shape foreign policy. Oil
companies regularly invoked the possibility of other countries gaining leveraging influence in
Saudi Arabia when attempting to make State Department policy more to their liking. During World
War II, the broad outline of American-Saudi diplomacy was influenced by a number of additional
factors. It continued to be influenced by Socal and Texaco, who looked to protect their concession.
But in the final years of the war, it was also shaped by American strategic designs in response to
both the specific needs of the war effort and the world that military and diplomatic personnel
expected would exist after the war. During World War II, Saudi Arabia served as a vital conduit
to transfer supplies and personnel between the European and Pacific theater. After the war,
American strategic planners decided Saudi oil would serve as an anchor for both American military
security at home and stability in the Eastern Hemisphere.

5

This paper is divided into four parts. The first part covers the geopolitics of the Middle East
and the United Kingdom’s hegemony in the region from World War I to 1928. The second part
examines why the American oil industry took an interest in the Middle East after World War I and
how oil companies secured their rights in the region by influencing the United States government
and the press. It also looks at how Socal (and eventually Texaco) set up operations in Saudi Arabia.
The third part looks at American diplomacy with Ibn Saud’s kingdom from 1928 to 1942, and the
vital role Socal played in facilitating and encouraging a closer relationship between the two
countries in the context of rapidly escalating world tension. The fourth part examines how and
why American foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia shifted in 1943, becoming much more
involved because of American plans for the kingdom’s oil and military potential, and the
continuities of American foreign policy in the months after the war ended.
I
It is necessary to examine how Britain established political hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Persian Gulf in order to understand the geopolitical situation beginning in the late 1920s
when American oil companies and the State Department became interested in the region. As early
as the late eighteenth century, Great Britain had sought to secure the Suez route to India and the
East Indies for the purpose of trade, transport, and communications. The only alternatives were to
either sail around the Cape of Good Hope or sail through the Persian Gulf and then travel overland
through Mesopotamia and then Constantinople. By comparison, the Suez route was not only faster,
it was easier for Great Britain to monopolize.6
Maintaining British imperial integrity was therefore dependent on two strategies. First,
Britain sought to prevent any other great power from using or exerting pressure on the Suez route,
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be it France during the Coalition Wars, Russia for most of the nineteenth century, or Germany and
then Italy for the first half of the twentieth century.7 This meant preventing the other great powers
from gaining access to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, both of which lay along
the flank of the route to India. Second, Britain sought to secure any ports from which hostile navies
might menace British shipping. To that end, the United Kingdom signed protectorate agreements
with Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, and the Trucial States in the early nineteenth century. These
agreements compelled the signatories to refer all diplomatic disputes to the British Foreign Office
and not enter into agreements with non-Arabian powers without British consent.8 In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain added Egypt, Kuwait, and Cyprus to this sphere
of influence, while largely ignoring the impenetrable interior of the Arabian Peninsula, so long as
her protectorates on the coasts were not threatened.
The discovery of oil in Mesopotamia and Iran in the first decade of the twentieth century
would eventually provide Britain with a third major strategic interest in the Middle East. Still, for
at least the early years of World War I, British foreign policy in the Middle East was focused on
finding regional support for the Allied campaign against the Ottomans. Besides signing secret
agreements with the French and the Russians promising each of them a sphere of influence in the
soon-to-be-dismembered Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom also initiated diplomacy with two
rival leaders in Arabia—Hussein bin Ali Al-Hashimi, the Sharif of Mecca and Emir of Hejaz, and
Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd—in order to support its position in the peninsula (and, by
extension, Mesopotamia).9 The British persuaded Sharif Hussein and Ibn Saud to agree to a
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temporary truce and to attack the Ottomans and their allies. In the case of the Hejaz, the British
Foreign Office extended a subsidy to Hussein and seemingly encouraged his Arab nationalist
ambitions, going so far as to promise rule over an Arab state in Syria to Hussein’s son Faisal,
despite also agreeing to award Syria to the French.10
The British concluded a treaty with Ibn Saud at Darin in 1915 that was in many respects
similar to the protectorate treaties signed with the coastal Sheikhdoms in the nineteenth century.
Ibn Saud promised not to intervene in the affairs of the Sheikhdoms, nor to correspond with, entreat
with, or grant concessions to any other great power without first consulting the British government.
In return, he received diplomatic recognition and promise of non-interference in Nejd’s internal
affairs, a guarantee in the event of unprovoked attack, and shipments of arms and an annual subsidy
of £5,000.11 The Saudis were concerned with maintaining their independence and with preventing
an attack by the Hashemites, a fact known to the Foreign Office.12 Ibn Saud was also aware of how
British power encircled his Emirate in Arabia, and though it took him time to sever
communications with the Turks, he launched an attack against another of his longtime rivals, the
Ottoman-supported Rashidi Emirate of Hail.13
Though the Middle East was never a major theater in World War I, British geologists
believed it held significant oil reserves, which made the region extremely important during peace
negotiations. With its introduction of tanks, planes, and trucks to the battlefield, the First World
War very quickly demonstrated the necessity of oil not just to the United Kingdom’s military
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planners but to all of the world’s great powers. A few weeks after the war ended, Lord Curzon
(then in the British War Cabinet) told the Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference that “the Allied cause
had been “floated to victory on a wave of oil,” because if it had not been for the great fleets of
motor trucks the war could not have been won.”14 Even more worryingly for Britain, German
interdiction of oil tankers towards the end of 1916 had created such a shortage of oil that the Royal
Navy was compelled to halt some of its naval operations. The British Empire could not survive
without the Royal Navy, and the Royal Navy, which switched its main fuel from coal to petroleum
under the supervision of Winston Churchill, was fast becoming dependent on a reliable oil
supply.15 Though most of the oil Lord Curzon referred to was shipped from the United States,
British strategists decided the maintenance of the empire, which already depended on Middle
Eastern communication lines and shipping routes, would also require securing Middle Eastern
reserves.16 Taking the shortage caused by German interdiction to heart, a geology expedition was
dispatched to Mesopotamia in 1917 with the primary objective of securing oil refineries and
pipelines for Anglo-Persian Oil Company.17
The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres imposed a new Anglo-French imperial order on the Arab Middle
East, although Turkey managed to preserve her sovereignty (albeit within reduced borders) by
negotiating the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Sèvres assigned the territories of Iraq and Palestine as
mandates to Britain and Syria and Lebanon to France.18 This did not endear either France or the
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United Kingdom to the people of the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, was
generally held in high regard. The American presence in the Middle East up to that point was
mostly a collection of missionaries and educators, and the citizens of the British and French
mandates took Woodrow Wilson’s apparent commitment to self-determination seriously, even if
it ultimately failed to materialize.19 Although the Wilson administration was aware of the Allied
Powers’ plans to partition the Ottoman Empire when the United States joined the war in 1917 (and
the twelfth item in the Fourteen Points stated that the US would not accept such an arrangement),
America never signed the Treaty of Sèvres and Wilson’s objections were ultimately of no
consequence.20
With the other imperial powers of Europe having collapsed, the positions of the British and
French Empires looked at first glance unchallengeable. The United Kingdom had absolute naval
supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, along with
unchallenged influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Britain was now even able to secure the
Mesopotamian overland route between the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, both countries moved to monopolize investments in the resources of their newlyestablished mandates (and, in Britain’s case, protectorates established before the war), most
notably in oil.21 The culmination of Anglo-French negotiations over how to divide the oil reserves
of Ottoman territory was the San Remo Agreement of 1920. This secret agreement secured France
its share of Middle Eastern oil by awarding it Germany’s 23.75 percent interest in the Turkish

as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism while allowing it to conserve its war-sapped manpower and
resources. Wilson, however, refused, citing the difficulty of persuading the American public and the Senate to
consent. For more detail see DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 114-118 and Uriel Dann,
The Great Powers in the Middle East: 1919-1939 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 242.
19
Dann, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 225, DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East,
112-13 and 321, and Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, 13.
20
DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 110.
21
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Petroleum Company, a joint venture operating in Mosul oil fields. In return, France consented to
the British building a pipeline to the Mediterranean that crossed French mandates.22
Following World War I, the former Ottoman territories experienced a wave of Arab
nationalism that resulted in anti-imperialist uprisings in Iraq and Syria. Though the British had
encouraged Arab nationalism during the war, Britain’s failure to uphold her promise of
independence and Wilson’s rhetoric about self-determination strengthened nationalistic fervor in
the mandates after Sèvres.23 Outside of the mandates, Ibn Saud began waging war once again on
his old Hashemite rivals, and by 1925 he successfully deposed Sharif Hussein and thereafter ruled
both Nejd and Hejaz. Despite having made a bid for Arab unification himself, Sharif Hussein had
suffered a blow to his prestige in the Middle East. He was widely blamed for contributing to the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting subjugation by European empires, and his
claiming of the title of Caliph shortly after its abolition was not taken seriously. 24 More
importantly, however, the British cut Sharif Hussein loose, acquiescing to Ibn Saud’s conquests
and drawing hard borders in 1925 between Ibn Saud’s territory and Transjordan and Iraq.25
In 1927, the United Kingdom and Ibn Saud revised their 1915 agreement with the Treaty
of Jiddah, in which the British recognized Ibn Saud as the independent monarch of both provinces
and Ibn Saud reaffirmed his commitment to respect the British coastal protectorates.26 The treaty
was motivated in part by Britain’s desire to maintain good relations with the custodian of Mecca
and Medina, since the Foreign Office decided that this was vital to keeping the large number of
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Muslims living in India content.27 However, the degree to which the Jiddah Treaty truly affirmed
the independence of Hejaz and Nejd versus merely restructuring the old protectorate relationship
is up for debate. With his conquest of Hejaz in 1925, Ibn Saud had probably extended his domain
about as far as he possibly could. Hejaz and Nejd remained encircled by British satellites and
mandates on all sides, and Treaty of Jiddah did little to alter the reality that the dual monarchy was
still dependent on the UK for military defense.28
II
In the 1930s, two American companies—Standard Oil of California (Socal) and the Texas
Company (Texaco)—built an oil industry in Saudi Arabia from scratch, and in a matter of years
the kingdom went from producing no oil to becoming the world’s largest oil producer. But the
story of how the American oil industry found itself in Saudi Arabia begins much earlier, when oil
companies took an interest in the Middle East at the end of World War I. The British decision to
exclude foreigners from operating in the mandates caused a diplomatic dispute with the United
States—not because it antagonized the United States government per se, but because it
antagonized United States oil companies who were diligent in lobbying the government to protect
American access to the mandates. This began even before the San Remo Agreement was signed
with the creation of the American Petroleum Institute (API) on March 14, 1919, which lobbied the
US government to push for the rights of American oil companies to operate abroad.29 The same
month, the Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony), which had acquired prospecting rights
near Jerusalem shortly before war broke out, complained to the State Department about the British
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army in Palestine seizing and copying their maps and drilling plans.30 Later that year, Socony
notified the State Department that the British army was preventing their representative from
operating in Mesopotamia, despite permitting a Shell Group geologist to work uninterrupted.31
Socony also informed the State Department that Britain refused to recognize any concessions that
had not been worked before the war.32
The American oil industry, so vital to the Allied victory in World War I, was looking to
the future of petroleum production with increasing alarm. Civilian demand in the United States
was already high and was only projected to go up, and it was doubtful whether American oil
extraction alone would be sufficient to meet it. The New York Journal of Commerce estimated that
per capita consumption of oil was 220 gallons in the United States compared to 14 gallons in the
rest of the world, and over ninety percent of motorcars on the roads were American.33 Worryingly,
British oil companies (chief among them Royal-Dutch Shell, a joint Anglo-Dutch enterprise, and
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) had managed to acquire rights to over half of the world’s proven
reserves.34 Moreover, the governments of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were
extremely protective of their overseas possessions, and had no intention of allowing American
companies to prospect in them. The American oil industry believed these restrictions were unfair,
since the United States government imposed no such restrictions on foreign companies operating
in American territory.35 The San Remo Agreement, which effectively froze Americans out of the
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Middle East entirely by denying them the chance to buy into the Turkish Petroleum Company, was
the final straw. The newly-created American Petroleum Institute, along with the older American
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, lobbied the executive branch and Congress. The
two industry groups warned an oil shortage was on the horizon. They also pointed to the crucial
role oil played during the war, and encouraged the government to demand equal treatment for
American companies abroad via diplomatic channels.36
The oil companies got results. The State Department was sufficiently concerned with
whether American oil companies would be able to operate in Mesopotamia and Palestine that it
inquired to the US peace delegation about whether Britain planned to reserve the mandates’ oil
reserves for itself.37 Adapting America’s China policy from the turn of the century, the United
States government committed to demanding an “Open Door” in the mandates.38 Wilson signed the
Mineral Leasing Act into law in 1920, which empowered the government to bar leasing on public
lands to any foreign nationals from countries that did not reciprocate such open access to
Americans business.39 The State Department also lodged a complaint with the British Foreign
Office on the matter. When Lord Curzon pointed out that the United Kingdom accounted for a
measly 4.5% of global oil production and protested American hypocrisy in demanding an Open
Door policy while interfering with British attempts to secure concessions in Haiti and Costa Rica,
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby accused Britain of making promises in the San Remo
agreement which violated the principle of the mandate system and questioned whether the Turkish
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Petroleum Company possessed rights to any concession prior to the war.40 Even more striking is
how quickly the prospective oil shortage became accepted as self-evident fact. The State
Department, which had barely (if at all) been concerned about a global shortage through the course
of the war, cited “the shortage of petroleum, its constantly increasing commercial importance, and
the continuing necessity of replenishing the world’s supply by drawing upon the latent resources
of undeveloped regions” as a justification for why the principle of equal treatment must be upheld
in the mandates.41
The strategic importance of oil was something nearly everyone working in both the
government and in the press understood, and the oil industry faced little political opposition.
American oil companies enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington, and the State Department’s
stance on the principle of equal treatment in the Mesopotamian mandate did not change with
Warren Harding’s election and the appointment of Charles Evan Hughes as Colby’s successor as
Secretary of State. Additionally, major newspapers were largely unanimous in support of the
American oil industry’s point of view. A Literary Digest review of newspaper articles from
December 1920 showcased a number of different arguments in favor of American oil companies’
rights in the Middle East. Newspapers argued that “what the United States is asking on the subject
of Mesopotamia is what we have always been willing to grant to the whole world,” and whether
the United States joined the League of Nations or not, America was “bound to see to it that other
nations do not monopolize the exploitation of territory we helped to free from the Central
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Powers.”42 When the United States dispatched observers to the Lausanne negotiations, most
newspapers approved of Secretary of State Hughes’ diligence in protecting American oil interests,
with only a few questioning whether the State Department was really just protecting corporate
profits.43
The resolution of this Anglo-American dispute over the mandates came in 1928 with the
signing of the Red Line Agreement, which allowed Standard Oil of New York, Standard Oil of
New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Atlantic Refining, and the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company
to buy into the Turkish Petroleum Company. The Agreement also prohibited all stakeholders in
the venture from operating anywhere in the former Ottoman Empire except Kuwait. The Red Line
Agreement represented a broader shift in American oil diplomacy away from the interventionism
of the early interwar years, which occurred because of changes in the supply and demand of oil.
The discovery of additional reserves in the American Southwest in 1924 and the resulting increase
in domestic petroleum production helped assuage oilmen’s fears of insufficient supply.44
Thereafter, the impending oil shortage, which had once been conventional wisdom, received less
and less newspaper coverage as it receded into memory. With the steep reduction in domestic
demand brought about by the Great Depression, the specter of an oil shortage evaporated, and the
government no longer felt the kind of pressure to pursue an aggressive oil policy abroad that it had
confronted just after World War I.45 The result was that by 1929, the State Department conducted
only brief (and far less contentious) correspondence with its British chargé on the issue of
American oil operations in Bahrain. There are no State Department records of Socal asking the
Department to provide assistance in the negotiation of its concession in Saudi Arabia, despite the
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Turkish Petroleum Company (now rechristened as the Iraq Petroleum Company) also being in
negotiations with the Saudis for drilling rights.
Gulf Oil had acquired rights to a concession in Bahrain in 1927 from the Eastern and
General Syndicate, a British speculator.46 However, because the Red Line Agreement barred any
Turkish Petroleum Company stakeholder from operating independently in an area that included
Bahrain, the company sold its rights in 1928 to the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal)
for $50,000. Socal was a relative newcomer among American oil companies to international
exploration. Although the oil shortage panic had abated by 1928, the company still poured millions
into prospecting abroad, and eventually decided to focus its attention on the Persian Gulf region
as a hedge against any future supply shortages.47 This brought the company into conflict with
Anglo-Persian and the other British companies that operated in the Middle East. Though the British
had mostly ignored the Arabian Peninsula, as its geology was different from the oil-producing
geology of Iran and Iraq, they nonetheless did not want regional competition.48
Complaining to the British Colonial Office, the British companies successfully held up
renewal of the concession shortly after Socal purchased it. The Colonial Office demanded the
insertion of provisions in the concession requiring that the company operating it be Britishregistered and that its managing director plus a majority of board members be British subjects.49
Socal’s response to British demands was to set up and assign the concession to a subsidiary
registered in the Dominion of Canada, the Bahrain Petroleum Company. As Socony and Standard
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Oil New Jersey had done several years earlier, Socal took its case to the State Department. 50
However, in contrast to the years-long dispute over the Mesopotamian oil fields, the Bahrain issue
was resolved in short order. The British government assented to the Bahrain Petroleum Company
operating the concession in 1929.51
Socal first considered extending its operations to the Arabian mainland in 1930, when it
asked the Saudis about whether they might grant the company rights to free exploration.52 The
company became increasingly interested in the Arabian mainland in 1932, after successfully
striking oil in Bahrain and after a meeting between businessman and former ambassador Charles
Crane and Ibn Saud arranged by Ibn Saud’s British expat advisor St. John Philby.53 Socal
executives had corresponded with Philby for some time, and Philby’s notes about the geology of
the Arabian interior were the company’s first clue as to Saudi Arabia’s oil potential.54 Crane
contacted Karl Twitchell, a mining engineer who in the 1920s had occasionally conducted survey
work in Arabia at the behest of the American government, and asked him to lead a prospecting
expedition for oil in the province of al-Hasa.55 Twitchell’s surveying indicated oil was indeed
buried there, and he notified Socal Vice President Francis Loomis, who had previously worked as
a diplomat for the State Department. Loomis wrote to Philby to tell him Socal desired to drill for
oil and requested Philby keep him in the loop regarding what would be needed to secure Ibn Saud’s
approval.56
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Representatives from the Iraq Petroleum Company also expressed their interest in
negotiating a Saudi concession. Philby replied that the Saudis were aiming for a payment of one
hundred thousand pounds in gold, which the Iraq Petroleum Company representatives scoffed at
as outrageous.57 The Saudi government lowered its asking price to fifty thousand pounds, and
Socal counteroffered with thirty-five thousand pounds up front. On May 29, 1933, the terms of the
concession were finalized. Socal received drilling rights to an exclusive area of 360,000 square
miles in eastern Saudi Arabia, and agreed to provide a loan of thirty thousand pounds in gold, to
be repaid via deductions from future royalties, as well as an annual royalty of five thousand pounds
in gold.58 Further stipulations provided for the construction of a refinery “as soon as practicable
after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities,” the provision of all topographic maps
and operations report to the Saudi government, and a guarantee that Socal would not interfere with
the kingdom’s administrative, political, or religious affairs.59
There is a strong consensus in the scholarship on the Socal concession that Ibn Saud was
motivated almost entirely by money.60 The kingdom’s primary source of revenue was the taxes
collected from pilgrims to the holy cities, but the Great Depression severely reduced the number
of people undertaking the Hajj from over one hundred thousand in 1930 to under twenty thousand
by 1933.61 The result was a catastrophic financial shortfall. Ibn Saud was probably between
£300,000 and £400,000 in debt by 1933.62 Philby would later remark that the concession “turned
on the down payment” of gold that Socal promised, and which the Iraq Petroleum Company had
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balked at.63 Another hypothesis is that Ibn Saud granted the concession to an American rather than
a British company as a way of asserting his independence from the United Kingdom. While the
British were providing a stipend to Ibn Saud, they had also propped up and financed his Hashemite
rivals in Iraq and Transjordan, and there was no guarantee they would not back them at Saudi
expense in a future conflict.64 Most scholars reject this explanation, but what is undoubtedly true
is that Ibn Saud regularly compared the United States favorably to the United Kingdom when
conferring with American businessmen and diplomats. At one point, Ibn Saud told an American
envoy that he had valued the American government’s noninvolvement and Socal’s lack of any
ulterior political motive.65 Ibn Saud was also fond of telling American visitors his reasons for
dealing with Socal as opposed to one of its competitors. He would praise the Americans’ ingenuity
in oil exploration, compliment Americans for being “more interested in business than in acquiring
political advantage,” and note that the United States was “very far away!”66
Most likely, the Saudi government was concerned first and foremost with securing its own
rule, and that meant balancing a number of different aims. That the concession included a
commitment from Socal not to interfere in Saudi internal affairs indicates that Saudi leadership
considered the Kingdom’s sovereignty important. On the other hand, the risk posed by internal
dissent in 1933 far outweighed the risk of Britain meddling in Saudi affairs or supporting the
kingdom’s rivals. The Ikhwan (the main Saudi military force) had agitated against Ibn Saud’s
laxity on enforcing religious law for quite some time and, when the concession was negotiated, a
high-ranking sheikh within the Ikhwan directly challenged Ibn Saud, labeling him insufficiently
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Islamic.67 Though Ibn Saud supposedly managed to win the sheikh over with his charm and the
judgement of a qadi, such a challenge represented the biggest threat to his rule. The king relied on
support from the clan leaders, which he secured through a combination of development and direct
provision of supplies and money, something that the budget shortfall threatened to interrupt.68 And
whatever skepticism Ibn Saud had towards the United Kingdom’s motives, he continued
collaborating with the British and they continued subsidizing the kingdom well into World War
II. Indeed, the Saudi government’s interest in securing financial aid would remain a constant in
the country’s diplomacy well past the end of the war. Assuming that Ibn Saud’s praise of the
Americans for their pursuit of profits over politics was not merely flattery, it was probably of
secondary concern to the payments Socal offered.
For its part, there were several reasons why Socal would have been drawn to operate in
Saudi Arabia. Socal had been excluded from the Red Line Agreement, but still sought the same
access to cheap reserves that the signatories of the agreement were pursuing. Another agreement
between the oil companies signed in 1928 at Achnacarry in Scotland meant producing and selling
oil in the Eastern Hemisphere became extremely profitable.69 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia offered
an additional advantage to any company looking to circumvent granting labor concessions: it did
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not have functioning unions, political parties, or a Parliament.70 In contrast to Iran and Iraq (which
produced the bulk of Middle Eastern oil when Socal began its negotiations), workers in Saudi
Arabia had few avenues through which to voice demands for fairness or improvements in
education, training, wages, or promotions.
Shortly after negotiations concluded, Socal set up the California-Arabian Standard Oil
Company (Casoc) as a subsidiary to operate the concession. Socal only contacted the State
Department after securing the concession, requesting help in obtaining authorization from British
authorities for the company’s flights in Egyptian, Iraqi, and Bahraini airspace. 71 Drilling
commenced in 1935 at the Dammam salt dome. In 1936, a deal was reached with the Texas
Company (Texaco) for the purchase of a half-interest in the Casoc operations. The deal served
both parties well. Socal received access to the market outlets where Texaco was well-established
as well as integration into Texaco’s global marketing organization, while Texaco secured a more
accessible supply of crude oil.72 Oil was finally discovered on March 4, 1938 at Dammam well
number seven, and Socal determined it was commercially viable by October of that year.73 Casoc
negotiated a supplemental agreement expanding the concession in 1939, receiving rights to an

70

Vitalis, America’s Kingdom, 20-25, 40-41, and 54-59. Vitalis also examines how the oil industry in the US
pioneered workforce segregation and union busting as way to forestall giving concessions to labor and then
exported them to its foreign operations across the globe. This included Socal, which paid American and Arabian
workers different wages, kept them in separate quarters, and generally barred them from interacting or sharing
spaces.
71
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I,
eds. Rogers P. Churchill, Matilda F. Axton, Shirley L. Landau, Newton O. Sappington, and Kieran J. Carroll
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Document 660,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d660, Document 663,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d663, and Document 664,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d664.
72
Aramco Handbook, 111-12, Chester, US Oil Policy and Diplomacy, 233, and Stoff, Oil, War, and American
Security, 36.
73
Powers et al., “Geology of the Arabian Peninsula.”

22

additional 135,000 square miles in exchange for £140,000 in gold and a £20,000 royalty, with the
promise of additional £100,000 upon discovery of oil in the additional territory.74
By 1940 Casoc had surveyed up to 175,000 square miles and mapped in detail 50,000
square miles of the concession’s territory, but Casoc’s operations shut down almost entirely within
a couple of years following the outbreak of World War II.75 On October 18, 1940, Italian planes
bombed Casoc property at Al Khobar, damaging water and oil pipelines.76 Six months later, by
May of 1941, Casoc evacuated their workers’ families and the majority of their workforce.77 The
few employees who remained in the field continued producing between twelve and fifteen
thousand barrels of oil per day, which were shipped to the refinery in Bahrain.78 At the king’s
request, they also conducted surveys for water and agricultural potential and used company trucks
to deliver food to the villages.79 After the last German and Italian forces were pushed out of the
Middle East and North Africa in May of 1943, the company gradually started resuming its
operations. Casoc drilled a new well at al-Jauf in 1943, although the well proved unsuccessful.
The company changed its name to the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) on January 31,
1944, and by the end of the year, Aramco had two surface-mapping parties working in the field.80
By the time World War II ended, oil production returned to its pre-war level (as we will see, with
significant assistance from the American government), and Aramco discovered three additional
oil fields at Abu Hadriya, Abqaiq, and al-Qatif.81 Oil production grew exponentially in the years
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after the war, and by 1950, Saudi Arabia was the world’s leading producer of oil. Aramco launched
a number of construction projects after the end of World War II, including the Trans-Arabian Oil
Pipeline (also called Tapline), a refinery at Ras Tanura not too far from Dhahran, and a number of
railways built at the behest of the Saudi royal family.82
III
America’s diplomatic contact with Saudi Arabia, which had hitherto been minimal, proceeded to
grow significantly between 1928 and 1942. This process started slowly, but accelerated after
Socal’s negotiation of the Saudi concession in 1933, and was thereafter aided and encouraged by
the company’s personnel. Diplomats from the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd initiated contact with
the United States as early as 1928, inquiring about the possibility of diplomatic recognition. 83 In
1930, the Saudi financial minister requested that the Hoover administration dispatch a geology
expert to survey the country’s mineral and water resource potential.84 The expert the government
sent was none other than Karl Twitchell, whose prospecting would pique Socal’s interest in Saudi
oil. Secretary of State Henry Stimson approved the granting of diplomatic recognition to the
Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd in 1931, after deciding there was no reason why it should not be
extended.85 The State Department insisted as preconditions that the Hejazi government provide for
equal treatment and legal protections for American nationals per international law.86 The two
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countries’ diplomatic representatives drafted a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation,
granting the United States most favored nation status and enumerating the rights of American
diplomatic staff in Saudi Arabia, which was signed on November 7, 1933.87
Even after extending diplomatic recognition, contact between the Saudi government and
the State Department remained indirect, occurring almost entirely through either the British
minister to Hejaz or the American Consulate in Iraq. Although the Department had established the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs in 1909, it remained perpetually understaffed and overextended,
and the State Department did not even have a diplomatic corps fluent in Arabic until after World
War II.88 The absence of any American diplomatic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia meant that the
State Department relied on Americans on the ground for intelligence, the vast majority of whom
were Socal executives and representatives. There is hardly any mention of Saudi Arabia in State
Department archives prior to 1939, and a review of the handful of State Department memos
discussing Saudi Arabia in between 1933 and 1938 demonstrates the degree to which Socal not
only influenced, but also served as a conduit for diplomacy between the United States and the
kingdom. As previously noted, in 1934 Socal asked for the State Department’s help in securing
authorization from British authorities for the company’s flights in Egyptian, Iraqi, and Bahraini
airspace.89 In 1937, a year after a revolt broke out in the Palestinian mandate over Jewish
immigration, James Moffett, who was chairman of the board of the Bahrain Petroleum Company
and who was representing his parent company Socal, met with Wallace Murray, the State
87

Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East
and Africa, Volume II, eds. Rogers P. Churchill, Matilda F. Axton, Newton O. Sappington, Morrison B. Giffen, and
Francis C. Prescott (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Document 758,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v02/d758.
88
Miller, Search for Security, 41-42, and Eveland, Ropes of Sand, 48-50.
89
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I,
Document 660, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d660, Document 663,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d663, and Document 664,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d664.

25

Department’s Chief of the Near Eastern Affairs Division. Moffett expressed concern that Ibn Saud
had become less amenable to Casoc expanding its operations and was drawing closer to Britain.
He further warned that the American government’s support for Zionist claims in Palestine might
lead the king to expel Socal and Texaco.90
It was in Socal’s interest that the American government establish more direct relations with
Saudi Arabia, and as early as 1936 the company’s executives began pushing the State Department
to accredit a minister to the kingdom. Though the American Consul General in Cairo decided that
American interests were insufficient to warrant establishing official representation, Socal
continued lobbying for diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia, and the State Department finally
changed its mind in 1939.91 By then, Casoc had over 325 Americans employed in Saudi Arabia,
and American financial interests had grown significantly since 1933.92 Furthermore, in early 1939,
Germany and Japan dispatched their diplomats in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia as a prelude to
negotiating trade deals.93 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, along with the American Ministers in
Cairo and Baghdad, cited the interest of the other major powers in the kingdom as a reason for
why the State Department ought to establish diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia. 94 In the
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summer of 1939, President Roosevelt nominated Bert Fish, already the American Minister in
Egypt, to serve as Minister to Saudi Arabia, and Fish was accredited in February of 1940.95
Ibn Saud continued to face financial difficulties. The number of pilgrims making the Hajj,
which had finally started recovering from its trough in the Great Depression, plummeted once
more with the outbreak of global war, causing tax and customs revenues to crater.96 Making
matters worse, Saudi Arabia suffered from below-average rainfall in the early 1940s, causing the
Saudi clans (on whose support Ibn Saud depended) to lose much of their livestock and threatening
to plunge the kingdom into famine.97 Ibn Saud requested a loan of $6 million from Casoc, once
again seeking to cover the country’s necessary expenses, but Casoc only managed to deliver $1
million.98 Fearing this was a prelude to their being asked to shoulder more of the kingdom’s
financial burdens, but also not wanting to jeopardize their concession, Socal and Texaco executives
decided to approach the American government about the issue.99
James Moffett met with President Roosevelt on April 9, 1941, hoping to persuade the
President to extend financial support to Saudi Arabia. Moffett explained Saudi Arabia’s dire
financial straits, claimed that Ibn Saud was “strongly pro-Ally” and second to none in terms of
prestige among Arabs and Muslims all over the world, and warned that if Ibn Saud’s budget of
$10 million was not covered, the kingdom, and possibly the entire Arab world, would be “thrown
into chaos.”100 Moffett also noted that Socal and Texaco had 160,000 American stockholders
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between them. Though the war had put oil production on hold, the Casoc concession held great
promise, as it was estimated to hold reserves of at least 750 million barrels.101 Moffett proposed
that the government purchase $6 million worth of finished oil products from the Saudis, for either
military use or to sell outright.102 A few weeks later, Max Thornburg, the vice president of Bahrain
Petroleum Company, met with the Division of Near East Affairs. Thornburg reiterated Moffett’s
proposal and promised that the Navy would not find cheaper oil anywhere else. He further stated
that if Ibn Saud did not have the funds necessary to feed his people, he would likely align himself
with the Axis powers.103
Even though Roosevelt seemed amenable to Moffett’s plan, it had a number of problems.
Wallace Murray noted that there was no way to sell the oil in Europe or Asia because of the war,
which meant it would have to be transported to the Western Hemisphere.104 Murray proposed that
the government cover half of the $6 million shortfall by sending supplies to Saudi Arabia under
the Lend-Lease Act, with the Navy purchasing enough oil to cover the other half.105 However,
Secretary of Navy Frank Knox determined that none of the finished oil products in question were
of good enough quality for military use. In a memo to Roosevelt, Knox said he understood the
importance of securing Ibn Saud’s support, but there was no good reason for entangling such
support in the deal Moffett proposed.106 The idea of using lend-lease fell through when Jesse Jones,
the Secretary of Commerce and Federal Loan Administrator, opposed it on the grounds that “the
national interest was not going to be served by extending financial assistance to a backward,
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corrupt, and non-democratic society like Saudi Arabia. Such aid amounted to paying homage to a
self-styled monarch while at the same time using the government to support the interests of private
enterprise.”107
Rather than extending aid directly to Saudi Arabia, whether by purchasing oil or through
lend-lease, the American government decided instead to ask the United Kingdom to take care of
Ibn Saud’s finances. Roosevelt, not wishing to provoke the isolationists in Congress, doubted
whether the Lend-Lease Act authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to provide money
to a neutral nation, and both Jones and Roosevelt agreed that Saudi Arabia was ultimately Britain’s
responsibility.108 Roosevelt wrote to Jones, “Will you tell the British I hope they can take care of
the King of Saudi-Arabia. This is a little far afield for us!”109 Jones told British treasury officials
to furnish Ibn Saud with whatever money they felt desirable, and instructed the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to earmark the $10 million that Ibn Saud had requested into a $450 million
lend-lease loan to the United Kingdom.110
Realizing an indirect loan would annoy both Ibn Saud and Socal executives, the State
Department responded to both parties’ concerns in August of 1941. Murray took a meeting with
the Presidents of Casoc and the Bahrain Petroleum Company, where he explained how Jones
planned to get the money to Saudi Arabia, stating that the government believed the kingdom was
in the British sphere of influence and that Britain had more experience with these sorts of
subsidies.111 The executives complained that if Americans put up the money, America ought to
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get the credit. They assured Murray the Navy’s concerns over the quality of the oil were
unfounded and promised they could deliver up to $500,000 worth of oil per month if provided
with tankers, but the government remained unmoved.112 Meanwhile, Cordell Hull instructed
Alexander Kirk, who had succeeded Bert Fish as Minister in Egypt, to explain to Ibn Saud that
Britain would continue its subsidy for the time being and while the United States would be
willing to consider other ways of assisting his government, due to the circumstances of the war,
it would only be prudent to extend lend-lease aid to countries that were “actively resisting
external aggression, or which for geographical reasons are important to the national defense.”113
Fearing that the latter clause would be perceived as an insult by Ibn Saud in particular, and the
entire message as an endorsement of British imperialism in the Middle East more broadly, Kirk
drafted a more concise message informing the king that it was simply not possible to provide
lend-lease aid under existing legislation.114
Even if Saudi Arabia was not vital to American national defense, the United States and the
United Kingdom nonetheless took an interest in the country. Importantly, Allied interest was not
due to Saudi Arabia being a major oil producer. Besides the quality issues Knox identified with
Saudi oil, both Iran and Iraq still produced far more oil than Saudi Arabia in the early 1940s, and
oil production dropped off precipitously across the Middle East due to the war.115 Nor was it
because Saudi Arabia had become a belligerent in the war, which would not happen until February
of 1945. Rather, their interest stemmed from the country’s geography and its relation to their
military strategy, and in fact strongly paralleled historic British strategic concerns regarding the
maintenance of her empire. The ports and supply routes necessary to ship lend-lease materiel to
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the Soviet Union were all located in the Middle East.116 Additionally, by March of 1942, the War
Department determined that the Arabian Peninsula was ideally suited for refueling planes flying
between eastern Africa and India.117 The State Department subsequently asked the Saudis about
flight authorizations and air basing in July, and managed to secure the former in August, although
the Saudis did not agree to the latter until after the end of the war.118 State Department officials
also agreed with near unanimity that as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Ibn Saud’s word
carried special weight with the global Muslim population, a conclusion also reached by the British
Foreign Office some decades before.119
On the other hand, should Axis forces manage to overrun the Middle East, which seemed
a real possibility prior to El Alamein, the Allied strategic situation would become dire. German
military planners were aware that they would need to secure the Arab Middle East and Persia if
they wished to open a new front against either the Soviet Union or British India. 120 Germany and
Italy also took into account Arab resentment towards British imperialism, issuing radio broadcasts
in Arabic declaring that Axis victory would lead to the liberation of the Middle East.121 Hull noted
in his memoir that the Middle East was the logical place for German and Japanese forces to link
the European and Pacific theaters, and an Axis victory there would effectively cut the world in
two.122 Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes warned Roosevelt that a German victory against Russia
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in the Caucuses and Britain in the Middle East would secure colossal oil reserves for the Third
Reich.123 The military began drafting contingency plans to protect the Saudi oil fields from German
and Italian forces, ultimately deciding to install anti-aircraft guns in Dhahran and to train some
Saudis and Casoc employees in the region as soldiers.124
For these reasons, the American and British governments both courted the kingdom’s
friendship during the early years of World War II. British representatives met with the Saudi royal
family in August of 1941 and, seeking to remain in their good graces, Ibn Saud expelled the
German Minister in Iraq (who also served as the Reich’s envoy to Saudi Arabia) from the kingdom,
exhorted his subjects to cooperate with the Allies, and interned Italian and German sailors rescued
from ships sunk in the Red Sea.125 The State Department, eager to lessen Ibn Saud’s
disappointment after declining to extend lend-lease, fast-tracked a proposal by Karl Twitchell to
send experts in agriculture and ground water resources as advisors to the king.126 The agricultural
mission to Saudi Arabia was formally authorized in February of 1942, with Twitchell himself
chosen to lead it. The State Department confidentially notified Kirk that the War Department
hoped to establish airfields in Saudi Arabia and would be assigning an officer to accompany the
mission when it arrived in Cairo, who would report back to Washington the preliminary results
from their surveys.127 Citing the importance of the war effort in the Middle East and the Air Force’s
interest in having airfields in Saudi Arabia, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles also drafted
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a letter for Roosevelt to send to Ibn Saud expressing his goodwill.128 This prompted the first of
several exchanges of letters between the two heads of state.
IV
If there was a single turning point in American foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, it occurred in
1943. This was the year the Allies reversed Axis military gains in North Africa; as a result,
American government officials became less concerned with preventing Middle Eastern oil reserves
from falling into Nazi hands. Instead, in the final two years of World War II, the American
government began taking a longer view, turning its attention to keeping the peace after the war
was over. Military planners and state department officials determined a secure supply of oil was
necessary to prevent future conflicts. Not only would such a supply sustain the American armed
forces, it would also be vital for meeting civilian demand, which would undoubtedly increase once
the war was over. Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves, served as a keystone in all of the various
plans military and state department personnel drafted.
Wallace Murray and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson both argued in favor of
extending lend-lease to Saudi Arabia as a means of securing the country’s significant oil reserves.
Reminding the State Department that the United Kingdom had excluded American companies
from Middle Eastern oil after World War I, Murray believed the United States government should
preempt the British from using their subsidy to gain leverage in the kingdom.129 Casoc oilmen,
still lobbying for financial assistance to Saudi Arabia, also encouraged the government to take a
longer view. Socal executives met with Harold Ickes on February 8, 1943. Rather than offering oil
up front for the war effort as Moffett had done, they took a page from the American oil advocacy
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groups during the 1920s and invoked the specter of an oil shortage. “The importance of this vast
reserve of American controlled petroleum,” they said, “becomes increasingly apparent as demands
on production within the United States point more and more to a decrease in our national reserves
and an increase in our national consumption. Maximum efficient production from all domestic
wells will soon be insufficient to meet this country’s expanding consumption and exports.”130
Casoc proposed establishing a special reserve for the United States government, and suggested
that the government might even acquire stock in the venture.131 This time, the company’s lobbying
was successful. Roosevelt authorized lend-lease to Saudi Arabia on February 18, 1943. In contrast
with Jesse Jones’ comment back in 1941 about the national interest, Roosevelt found that “the
defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States,” and noted that the White
House stated its conviction that the Muslim world was firmly on the side of the Allies.132 Saudi
Arabia had become far too important for the country’s budget to be sustained by a British subsidy
alone, and for the remainder of the war the United States would split aid to Saudi Arabia 50-50
with Britain.
Shortly after the last Axis forces pulled out of North Africa in June of 1943, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff determined that domestic oil production was too low to meet military and essential civilian
needs, making it imperative that the government acquire proven reserves in other parts of the
world. In a memo to the President, the Joint Chiefs recommended the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation establish a new, separate entity that would purchase a controlling interest for the
American government in the Saudi Arabian concession, with the ability to secure additional
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foreign oil reserves.133 Meeting with Cordell Hull, the Joint Chiefs stated it was necessary to build
a refinery in al-Hasa and to increase Saudi production as soon as possible, noting that Casoc had
not yet extracted very much oil from Saudi Arabia’s estimated reserves.134 Hull rejected the Joint
Chiefs’ proposals for direct government involvement in Saudi oil operations. Instead, he
recommended the government assist Socal and Texaco with oil production and refinery
construction, while making deals with the two companies to set aside whatever reserves the Army
and Navy believed necessary.135 Kirk would also oppose direct government involvement in oil
operations later that summer. He noted that Ibn Saud had appreciated the United States’ lack of an
ulterior motive in the Middle East up to that point, and pointed out such a move risked opening
the government “to the accusation of economic penetration for political purposes.”136 Since Casoc
was capable of meeting the military’s production quota, Kirk argued, it would be better to
collaborate with the private sector on oil production, “with direct government participation in the
national life of the respective countries limited to those fields in which our own enlightened
altruism cannot be impugned and which are fertile ground for the development of good will.”137
On June 25, 1943, officials from the Departments of State, War, Navy, and Interior drafted
plans for the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, which would have as its board of directors the
Secretaries of each of the four departments. As its first order of business, the Petroleum Reserve
Corporation would attempt to purchase 100% of the stock in Casoc from Socal and Texaco.138 If
a stock purchase was not possible, the officials recommended that the Petroleum Reserve
Corporation take up Casoc’s offer to set aside a percentage of its estimated reserves for the
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government and that the Corporation negotiate a contract with the company securing the right to
order oil production and delivery from this reserve at a fixed cost.139 Roosevelt authorized the
Petroleum Reserve Corporation in July, and officials from the four departments spent the next
several months negotiating as discreetly as they could with Casoc, Texaco, and the Saudi
government.140 However, the Petroleum Reserve Corporation’s attempt to purchase stock
ultimately fell through when the Corporation and the companies could not agree on the stock price.
It is possible that Socal and Texaco never actually had any interest in selling stock to the
government. On the other hand, at the end of 1943 the Casoc concession was at much less risk of
being bombed or seized by Axis forces than it had been at the beginning of the year, and it is also
possible that the companies felt more confident demanding a higher price than the government
was willing to pay.141
American government officials were also starting to realize that Saudi oil reserves were far
larger than the estimate of 750 million barrels Moffett had cited when he first approached the
government in 1941. A survey team headed by Evelyn DeGolyer determined that the entire Middle
East had truly colossal oil reserves, with Saudi Arabia alone having up to five billion barrels worth
of oil.142 In his February 1944 report, DeGolyer predicted that global oil production’s center of
gravity would shift from the Gulf of Mexico to the Persian Gulf in the coming years.143 Oil
production costs in the Middle East were low, only 10 to 15 cents per barrel, and though not many
wells had been drilled in the region up to that point, of those that had been, almost all proved to be
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big producers.144 At the same time, Casoc informed the State Department that the company hoped
to build both a refinery at Dhahran and a trans-Arabian oil pipeline capable of moving oil from alHasa to a port somewhere in the eastern Mediterranean.145 The President of Casoc highlighted the
strategic values of these proposed projects, noting that the trans-Arabian pipeline would “introduce
a new factor of high importance into the political and economic problems already facing the
governments which are vitally concerned in the development and world-wide distribution of Near
East oil.”146
The State Department, the Interior Department, and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board
reached a consensus on a new foreign policy at the beginning of 1944, one centered on the
American-held concession in Saudi Arabia. The Petroleum Board determined that neither present
wartime demand nor the expected peacetime civilian demand could be met with the Western
Hemisphere’s oil reserves alone (let alone the oil reserves within American borders).147 Therefore,
to safeguard “hemispheric security,” it would be necessary to conserve the Western Hemisphere’s
oil reserves so as to meet future military and civilian needs.148 To achieve this goal, a group of
State Department officials recommended a three-pronged foreign policy. The government should,
first, curtail the flow of petroleum from the Americas to the Eastern Hemisphere; second,
encourage expansion of Middle Eastern oil production to supply the global market, especially
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Europe; and third, push for an open-door policy in all Middle Eastern concessions where American
businesses had a stake.149
Harold Ickes and Cordell Hull each pursued two different strategies to achieve these goals.
Ickes, still in contact with Casoc oilmen, was convinced that the United States needed to
outmaneuver the British in Saudi Arabia in order to prevent a repeat of Britain’s exclusion of
American companies after World War I.150 Ickes and Knox had both supported the government
buying stock in Casoc, but the deal had come to nothing.151 Ickes therefore championed a proposal
by Commodore Andrew Carter of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. Carter recommended that the
United States government assume construction of the trans-Arabian pipeline from Casoc and
authorize the construction of the proposed refinery at Dhahran in exchange for the right to purchase
oil from the company at a fixed rate and a contract holding at least one billion barrels in reserve.152
In February of 1944, Ickes got the President, the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, and
representatives from Gulf Oil, Socal, and Texaco to agree to a deal based on Carter’s proposal that
included a clause prohibiting the companies from selling oil to any government or nationals of a
country not approved by the State Department.153 Ickes announced to the press that the Petroleum
Reserve Corporation sought to cooperate with and promote the private oil industry rather than
compete with it, and stated that the agreement would “assure an adequate supply of petroleum for
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the military and naval needs of the United States in view of the obligations for which this country
must assume for the maintenance of collective security in the post-war world.”154
However, Ickes’ deal ran into stiff opposition. Other oil companies feared that a glut of
eastern Mediterranean oil would cut into their profits in Europe, and lobbied conservative members
of Congress from oil-producing states to oppose the deal.155 Much of the press was also not
sympathetic to the plan. The New Republic labeled the pipeline agreement an appeasement of oil
companies and “a situation that looks dangerously like old-fashioned dollar diplomacy at its
worst,” while Christian Century stated “the principal consequences of this deal will be that the
people of the United States will underwrite with the blood of their sons the investment of three oil
companies.”156 The New York Times, while not overtly hostile to the pipeline proposal, still called
such government involvement in the private oil industry unprecedented.157 The proposal was
dropped and Aramco ultimately ended up constructing both the trans-Arabian pipeline and the
Dhahran refinery itself.
Hull, meanwhile, remained skeptical of direct government involvement in Middle Eastern
petroleum, preferring the use of diplomatic channels to increase the region’s oil production. In a
memo to Roosevelt, Hull stated that developing the region’s oil resources was tremendously
important in both the short- and long-term, and because Middle Eastern oil was held almost entirely
by the British and the Americans, it would be prudent for the two countries to cooperate. 158 Hull
arranged for the British to negotiate with officials from the Departments of State and Interior.159
154

“U.S. to Lay Oil Line in Near East; 1,200 Mile Pipe to Aid Our Forces,” The New York Times, February 6, 1944.
Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, 139-141.
156
“Pipeline in Arabia,” The New Republic, February 14, 1944, and “Oil Leads to Tie in Near East,” Christian Century,
February 16, 1944.
157
“Asian Oil Deal Tied to Foreign Policy: PRC to Build Pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the
Mediterranean,” The New York Times, February 20, 1944.
158
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV, Document
1009, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d1009.
159
Ibid.
155

39

To preempt the British from leveraging their subsidy in a quid pro quo for Saudi oil, Hull also
encouraged Roosevelt to increase lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia sixfold so as to match British
financial support.160 Hull even requested that Ickes put his negotiations with Casoc and Gulf Oil
on hold unless and until the United States and the United Kingdom agreed on the American
government’s direct participation in Middle Eastern oil.161 Ickes refused, telling Hull that the
pipeline deal concerned no other governments except those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and that
even if the American government did directly involve itself with Casoc’s and Gulf’s operations, it
would merely be placing itself on par with the British government.162 The two countries reached
an agreement in the summer of 1944, which, among other provisions, upheld the principle of equal
treatment in the two countries’ respective oil concessions.163 However, like Ickes’ pipeline plan,
the agreement ran into opposition from Congress and from the American oil industry. Though it
was sent to the Senate for redrafting, neither Roosevelt nor Truman pushed for the oil agreement’s
passage and it ultimately languished in committee.164
Though neither Ickes nor Hull were able to overcome resistance from the American oil
industry, the United States nonetheless escalated its military and financial commitments to Saudi
Arabia in the final years of World War II. It was at this time that the broad contours of American
policy with respect to Saudi Arabia during much of the Cold War took form. A group of Saudi
dignitaries that included two of Ibn Saud’s sons, Emirs Faisal and Khalid, visited Washington in
October of 1943. The State Department agreed to expedite delivery of trucks and radio equipment
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under lend-lease and to lend over five million ounces of United States Treasury silver to the
kingdom.165 Wallace Murray also brought up the Department’s intent to establish a consulate near
the proposed Dhahran refinery, citing the large number of American nationals working in alHasa.166 The State Department finally broached the War Department’s planned airbase at Dhahran
with the Saudi government in July of 1944.167 The military determined that an airbase at Dhahran
was “necessary for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific,” and the State Department signed on
to the plan because of the expected increase in the number of Americans working at Dhahran.168
However, the Saudis initially said no, and the State Department eventually determined that the
British had instructed them not to approve the project.169 In September of 1944, the Saudi Deputy
Foreign Minister asked the State Department about the possibility of extending a loan, complaining
that the combined supplies and financial aid the kingdom received from Britain and America was
insufficient.170 The Deputy Foreign Minister also stated Ibn Saud feared that the United States
would withdraw from Arabia after the end of the war and turn inwards as she had done
historically.171
Roosevelt met with a number of African and Middle Eastern heads of state immediately
following the Yalta Conference, including Ibn Saud on February 14, 1945, with whom he hoped
to address these issues. Colonel William Eddy, who served as translator, recorded Ibn Saud

165

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV, Document
879, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d879, and Document 881,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d881.
166
Ibid., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v04/d882.
167
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far
East, Volume V, Document 717, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d717.
168
Ibid., Document 723, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d723, and Document 724,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d724.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid., Document 801, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d801. The Deputy Foreign
Minister claimed the total aid Saudi Arabia received from both countries in 1944 was less than the British financial
subsidy alone had been in 1943.
171
Ibid.

41

discussing Winston Churchill and British machinations with Roosevelt. Ibn Saud recounted the
British telling him that the Americans would turn their focus back to the Western Hemisphere
when the war ended, and that the kingdom’s security and economic stability should be “bound up
with British foreign policy.”172 Roosevelt assured the king that American commitments to Saudi
Arabia would not diminish in the slightest when the war ended, expressing hope that spheres of
influence would be replaced by the Open Door, and that “the United States hopes the door of Saudi
Arabia will be open for her and for other nations.”173 For his part, Ibn Saud agreed to finally join
the war as a belligerent, and Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany shortly after the meeting.
When Roosevelt returned to Washington, he had the State Department redouble efforts to
provide additional financial aid to the kingdom. The British government wanted to reduce aid to
Saudi Arabia in 1945 to no more than $10 million, with the United States and the United Kingdom
still splitting the financial burden evenly.174 However, the State Department calculated that the
Saudis would require between $15 million and $18 million in supplies and funds.175 The State
Department informed the British Embassy that although it wished to continue the 50-50 split, it
fully intended to cover the Saudi budget for the upcoming year and would not accept an insufficient
aid package.176 Shortly after Truman was sworn in, the State Department explained to him that the
Export-Import Bank had been asked to extend a development loan to Saudi Arabia, but this would
not cover the kingdom’s budget shortfall, which the Department predicted would last for the next
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five years.177 To illustrate Saudi Arabia’s vital strategic importance to the new President, Dean
Acheson showed Truman a map of the Middle East’s oil reserves superimposed over the United
States and explained the colossal size of the Persian Gulf region’s proven reserves.178 Truman
authorized the State Department to proceed with its planned material and financial aid, and carved
out an exception for Saudi Arabia authorizing continued lend-lease to the kingdom through the
rest of the year, even as he terminated lend-lease to most of the other Allies in August of 1945.179
That month, the United States finally surpassed the United Kingdom in financial commitment to
Saudi Arabia, provisioning $11 million in aid compared to Britain’s $5 million.180
While negotiating financial support for Saudi Arabia, the State Department was also
continuing its efforts to bring the Dhahran airfield to fruition. State Department officials
approached the British Joint Chiefs of Staff who agreed to support the project as long as Britain
was given fly-over and landing rights, and the Foreign Office notified the Saudis that they were
withdrawing their objection in May of 1945.181 Ironically, although the War Department had
expected to use the airfield to redeploy troops from Europe to the Pacific, by June, the war situation
was such that it no longer believed the project was a military necessity.182 Nevertheless, even after
Japan had surrendered, the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State agreed that the Dhahran airfield
was in the national interest. Not only would it be useful for civilian aviation, it would also ensure
that the Aramco concession remained in American hands.183 Truman gave the go-ahead, and the
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military finished the airbase in February of 1946.184 With the onset of the Cold War, the Dhahran
airbase would quickly regain its military importance. It enabled the United States Air Force to fly
bombers into Soviet airspace from the southwest and protected a huge reserve of oil that military
planners believed absolutely necessary if the United States was to defend Western Europe or fight
a global war.185
The effects of World War II on American-Saudi diplomacy did not end with victory over
Japan, despite the War Department’s determination that the kingdom would be important to the
Pacific theater in the final months of the war. Nor, as Ibn Saud had feared, did American strategic
planning or diplomacy in the Persian Gulf region revert to a pre-war normal, even after the
government finally terminated lend-lease. Instead, the American government’s interest in Arabian
oil as a matter of the national interest, as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf, would
remain constant throughout the Cold War. It is true that in the years after 1946 a number of new
issues would arise that would affect American foreign policy with respect to Saudi Arabia. Some
concerns, such as shared opposition to Soviet communism and Arab unification, helped align the
United States and Saudi Arabia in pursuit of common goals. Others, such as the partition of Israel
and Palestine, created tension between the two countries. But none of these issues would
fundamentally alter the presence of the American oil industry in Saudi Arabia, nor of America’s
foreign policy that took form at the end of World War II.
Conclusion
This analysis has focused on explaining the origins and development of American-Saudi
diplomacy, and the complexity of America’s national interests in the Arabia Peninsula. National
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interest in diplomacy is not something that a government decides unilaterally, but is instead a
consensus reached by diplomatic and military staff, whose decisions are regularly influenced by
private actors. In the case of American foreign policy in Saudi Arabia, the notion that the kingdom
and its oil were vitally important to the American national interest was not self-evident to any
independent observer. Indeed, well into World War II, American government officials dismissed
the kingdom as irrelevant to the American national interest. Rather, growing awareness of
America’s national interest in Saudi oil was a product of decisions made by both oil company
executives and government bureaucrats, and was contingent upon the specific circumstances of
World War II. As this analysis has demonstrated, the American oil industry played a pivotal role
in shaping government policy from the end of World War I onward, and Socal’s contact with the
State Department not only shaped but drove much of United States foreign policy in Saudi Arabia
between 1928 and 1946. The wholly American owned and operated Casoc concession was almost
always front-and-center in the minds of bureaucrats during the 1930s and 1940s. During the
interwar period and World War II, Saudi oil became central to the American government’s
strategic planning, which was in many respects similar to that of the United Kingdom in prior
decades, as the United States government took an increasing interest in the kingdom’s geography,
its oil reserves, and its potential for strategically located transportation routes and military bases.
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